AES-Based Cryptographic and Biometric Security Coprocessor IC in 0.18-um CMOS Resistant to Side-Channel Power Analysis Attacks by Tiri, K. et al.
 AES-Based Cryptographic and Biometric Security Coprocessor IC in 0.18-µm CMOS 
Resistant to Side-Channel Power Analysis Attacks 
Kris Tiri, David D. Hwang, Alireza Hodjat, Bo-Cheng Lai, Shenglin Yang,  
Patrick Schaumont, and Ingrid Verbauwhede 
Electrical Engineering Department 
University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 90095 
{tiri, dhwang, ahodjat, bclai, shengliny, schaum, ingrid}@ee.ucla.edu 
 
Abstract 
This paper describes an embedded security coprocessor that 
consists of four components: an Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) based cryptographic engine, a fingerprint matching 
oracle, template storage, and an interface unit. Two function-
ally-identical coprocessors are fabricated using a TSMC 6M 
0.18-µm process. The first coprocessor uses standard cells and 
encrypts at 3.84 Gb/s. The second coprocessor uses Wave Dy-
namic Differential Logic (WDDL) combined with differential 
routing to combat side-channel information leakage through 
power analysis attacks. It encrypts at 0.99 Gb/s. The coproces-
sor is part of a security-partitioned embedded system called 
ThumbPod. 
Keywords: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), cryptog-
raphy, differential power analysis, coprocessor, biometrics. 
Introduction 
In recent years, the integrated circuit has emerged as a weak 
link in embedded security applications. The IC broadcasts in-
formation that is related to the secret key being used in the 
encryption operation. Several attacks have been reported that 
use information such as power consumption, time delay, and 
electromagnetic radiation to find the secret key. These side-
channel attacks (SCAs) are a real threat for any device in 
which the security IC is easily observable, such as smart cards 
and other embedded devices [1],[2]. As an example of the po-
tency of SCAs, Schneier wrote in 1998 that there is not enough 
silicon in the galaxy or enough time before the sun burns out to 
perform a brute-force attack (trying all possible keys) on the 3-
DES cipher with a 112-b key [3]. With the differential power 
analysis (DPA) side-channel attack, however, we were able to 
find the key of a standard cell IC AES implementation with a 
128-b key in less than three minutes with standard laboratory 
equipment. Clearly, SCAs pose serious concerns for the em-
bedded IC security community. 
There are two steps required to secure an embedded system 
from such side-channel attacks. The first step is security parti-
tioning, in which an embedded system is partitioned into two 
parts: a secure and an insecure module. Such partitioning en-
sures that the processing and storage of non-sensitive informa-
tion is done on the insecure module, and the processing and 
storage of all sensitive information is done on the secure mod-
ule. The second step is to use circuit and physical techniques to 
combat side-channel attacks on the secure module only. 
Though such techniques require considerable overhead in 
terms of area and power, due to security partitioning only the 
secure module must be protected for the system to remain se-
cure, thus minimizing such overhead.  
We have designed such a partitioned secure embedded sys-
tem called ThumbPod, which is used for biometric and crypto-
graphic embedded authentication, as shown in Fig. 1. Security 
partitioning has been performed to divide the system into an 
insecure module (an FPGA LEON 32-b RISC processor) and a 
secure module (a coprocessor IC).  
This paper discusses the secure coprocessor IC. The coproc-
essor consists of four components: an Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) based cryptographic engine, fingerprint match-
ing oracle, template storage, and an interface unit. 
Two functionally-identical coprocessors were fabricated on 
the same die using a TSMC 6M 0.18-µm process. The first 
coprocessor was implemented using standard cells and regular 
routing techniques. The second coprocessor was implemented 
using a logic style called Wave Dynamic Digital Logic 
(WDDL) and a layout technique called differential routing to 
combat side-channel power analysis attacks. We fabricated two 
functionally-identical coprocessors to allow us to compare the 
side-channel resistance of a typical IC versus one with special 
circuit techniques.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The next section 
describes the IC system architecture. The third section de-
scribes power analysis countermeasures. Subsequently, area, 
timing and power numbers are presented together with the 
power attack resistance. Finally related state-of-the-art and a 
conclusion are presented. 
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Fig. 1. ThumbPod system architecture (fabricated IC is shaded).  
 IC System Architecture 
The section of the paper describes the four components of 
the coprocessor IC as shown in Fig. 1: an Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) based cryptographic engine, fingerprint 
matching oracle, template memory, and an interface unit. 
The cryptographic engine consists of the AES core in Fig. 2  
together with a controller, registers, and an interface to 
read/hash the memory. The datapath is based on one round of 
the AES-128 algorithm along with on-the-fly key scheduling. 
The AES core is optimized for speed, with a goal of minimiz-
ing delay for one round. A full encryption of 128-b data using 
a 128-b key takes a total of 11 cycles. The crypto engine per-
forms AES encryption in ECB (Electronic CodeBook), OFB 
(Output FeedBack), and CBC-MAC (Cipher Block Chaining 
Message Authentication Code) modes without any loss in 
throughput. 
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the AES core. 
A neighbor-based fingerprint matching algorithm is per-
formed on the oracle. The feature extraction of a candidate 
fingerprint is done on the LEON, which then sends the oracle a 
fixed number of queries, each query consisting of an angle 
value, distance to neighbor, angle to neighbor, and angle of 
neighbor along with indexing terms. At each query, the oracle 
loads a section of the pre-stored template and implements cor-
relation functions. After the final query, the oracle makes a 
final accept/reject decision that is passed to the cryptographic 
engine as a security flag. To prevent adaptive query attacks, the 
oracle does not provide intermediate feedback to the LEON 
during the query phase, hence its name. The matching oracle 
algorithm has a false accept rate (FAR) of 0.01% and a false 
reject rate (FRR) of 1.5%.  
The register file for the storage of the fingerprint template 
can store up to 30 minutiae of 119 bits each. Each minutia con-
sists of its own angle value (5-b) and information for six minu-
tiae neighbors: distance to neighbor (8-b), angle to neighbor 
(6-b), and angle of neighbor (5-b). The maximum secure stor-
age size of a template is 3570 bits. 
The interface unit allows access to the IC by means of a 20-b 
instruction/data input bus and a 17-b output bus. The unit uses 
pipelined registers with logic gates to ensure stable data proc-
essing with one- or two-sided handshaking protocols. The co-
processor can operate with a 50 MHz processor within a range 
of clock frequencies from 1 MHz to 288 MHz.  
Differential Power Analysis Countermeasures 
Of all side-channel attacks, differential power analysis is a 
SCA of particular concern as it is very effective in finding a 
secret key. The attack is based on the fact that logic operations 
in standard static CMOS have power characteristics that de-
pend on the input data. Power is only drawn from the power 
supply when a 0 to 1 output transition occurs. (During 0 to 0 
and 1 to 1 transitions, no power is drawn. During a 1 to 0 tran-
sition, the stored capacitance is discharged to ground.) There-
fore, by measuring the power supply of an IC as it encrypts, 
and then performing statistical analysis of the measured power 
traces, the secret key can be determined. DPA has been proven 
effective in extracting the key of both microprocessor-based 
and ASIC-based encryption systems. 
To combat DPA, this paper presents a technique which pro-
vides a constant power dissipating logic: in one clock cycle the 
power consumption of each individual logic gate is constant 
and independent of its input signals. In other words, 0 to 0, 0 to 
1, 1 to 0, and 1 to 1 output transitions all draw the same power 
from the supply. The major advantages of employing a con-
stant power dissipating logic style are that this approach is a 
distributed countermeasure, is correct by construction, and is 
independent of the cryptographic algorithm or arithmetic im-
plemented. Two conditions must be satisfied to have constant 
power dissipating logic: a logic gate must have exactly one 
charging event per clock cycle; and the logic gate must charge 
a constant capacitance in that event.  
 Dynamic differential logic, also known as dual rail with pre-
charge logic, has a single charging event per cycle. The fabri-
cated IC uses Wave Dynamic Differential Logic [4], depicted 
in Fig. 3, to implement dynamic differential behavior using 
static CMOS standard cells.  
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Fig. 3. Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL).  
A WDDL gate consists of a parallel combination of two 
positive complementary gates. In the precharge phase, both 
true and false inputs are set to 0. This puts the output of the 
gate at 0. This 0 precharge value travels as the input to the next 
gate, creating a precharge “wave”. In the evaluation phase, 
each input signal is differential and the WDDL gate calculates 
a differential output. Fig. 3 shows the composition of the 
WDDL AOI221 gate with drive strength 2. Special registers 
and input converters, shown in Fig. 3, launch the precharge 
value. They produce an all-zero output in the precharge phase 
(clk-signal high) but let the differential signal through during 
the evaluation phase (clk-signal low).  
Besides a 100% switching factor, it is essential that a fixed 
amount of capacitance is charged during the transition. Thus, 
the total load at the true output of the differential gate should 
match the total load at the false output. The load capacitance 
has three main components: the intrinsic output capacitance of 
the gate, the interconnect capacitance, and the intrinsic input 
capacitance of the load. For high security applications, the con-
 tribution of all components must be constant. However, as the 
channel-length of transistors shrinks the interconnect capaci-
tances become the dominant capacitance [5]. Hence, the issue 
of matching the interconnect capacitances of the signal wires is 
crucial. 
The best strategy to achieve matched interconnect capaci-
tances is to route the true and false output signals with parallel 
routes that are at all times in adjacent tracks of the routing grid, 
on the same layers, and of the same length [6]. Then independ-
ent of the placement, the two routes have the same first order 
parasitic effects. We forced the place & route tool to route all 
true and false signals at all times in adjacent tracks by the fol-
lowing method. Each differential output pair is abstracted as a 
single “fat” wire, which has the width of 2 parallel wires plus 
spacing. The design is routed with the fat wire and at the end 
the fat wire is decomposed into the differential wires. Fig. 4 
demonstrates the place & route approach. 
      
Fig. 4. Place & route approach: fat design (left); and differential de-
sign (right).   
Results 
The prototype IC consists of two functionally-identical co-
processors fabricated on the same die. An insecure coprocessor 
is implemented using standard cells and regular routing tech-
niques. A secure coprocessor is implemented using WDDL 
and differential routing. Both coprocessors have been imple-
mented starting from the same synthesized gate level netlist. 
The WDDL gates have been derived from the commercial 
0.18µm, 1.8V static CMOS standard cell library used in the 
regular insecure design.  
Fig. 5 shows the encryption start signal and the supply cur-
rent of the coprocessors in OFB mode. The supply current of 
the insecure coprocessor exhibits large variations. It broadcasts 
the eleven encryption rounds. The high power peak at the start-
ing point of each new encryption can be used as a synchroniza-
tion signal. The power consumption profile of the secure im-
plementation on the other hand is invariant and does not reveal 
any information in a simple power analysis. In each clock cy-
cle, the same total load capacitance is charged.  
We performed DPA on each coprocessor as it executed 
AES, measuring 15,000 and 1,500,000 supply current acquisi-
tions for the standard cell and WDDL coprocessors, respec-
tively. In other words, we performed 15,000 encryptions on the 
standard cell coprocessor using the same key (with different 
inputs) while measuring the current fluctuations from the 
power supply. Using these current fluctuations we performed 
the correlation DPA attack. With WDDL, we performed 1.5 
million encryptions. 
The resistance against DPA is quantified with the number of 
measurements to disclosure (MTD), which is the cross-over 
point between the correlation coefficient of the correct key and 
the maximum correlation coefficient of all the wrong keys 
guesses. For both coprocessors, an attack on one key byte is 
shown in Fig. 6. MTD is shown in the “Correlation vs. Number 
of Measurements” graphs as the point where the black line 
crosses the grey envelope. Though only one of the sixteen key-
bytes (128-b key = 16 key bytes) is shown, the results for the 
other fifteen key bytes are similar.  
For the insecure coprocessor, 2,000 measurements are on 
average required to disclose a secret key byte. For one of the 
sixteen key bytes, a mere 320 samples are sufficient to mount a 
successful attack. As seen on Fig. 6, the peaks of the correla-
tion graphs are large. There is no doubt about the correct key 
byte. For the secure coprocessor, on the other hand, our meas-
urements show that out of sixteen keys bytes, WDDL effec-
tively protects five key bytes. One and a half million measure-
ments are not sufficient to disclose these five key bytes; one 
example is shown on the bottom of Fig. 6. The eleven key 
bytes that have been found required on average 255,000 meas-
urements. The improvement in DPA resistance makes the at-
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Fig. 5. Transient measurement (2 encryptions; 22 clock cycles) of 
encryption start signal (top) and core supply current (bottom).  
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Fig. 6. Cracking the secret key with differential power analysis: Stan-
dard cells and regular routing using 15K measurements (top); and 
WDDL and differential routing using 1.5M measurements (bottom). 
 tack de facto infeasible. The required number of measurements 
is larger than the lifetime of the secret key in most practical 
systems. 
The analysis also showed that for a dual rail design, the cor-
relation coefficient of the correct key guess can be negative. 
This means that the more bits change the less power is con-
sumed. This actually means that the 0 to 1 switching of the 
false net uses more power than the 0 to 1 switching of the true 
net. The parasitic capacitances affected by the false signals are 
larger than the ones affected by the true signals. On the other 
hand, for the five bytes that have not been found, the capaci-
tances have an almost perfect matching between the differential 
nets. Hence it is crucial to guarantee matched capacitances 
consistently for all the logic. Matching can be improved by 
shielding the differential routes on either side with a power line 
 to eliminate cross-talk effects. Alternatively, increasing the 
distance between different differential pairs would reduce the 
effect, or an improved iterative design flow could be used to 
identify and correct mismatches.  
Table I summarizes the results of the fabricated IC, whose 
micrograph is in Fig. 7. The standard cell coprocessor has 199 
Kgates with an area of 1.98-mm2 (0.79-mm2 for AES). The 
AES can operate at 330-MHz for a 3.84 Gb/s encryption rate. 
As far as we know, this is the fastest non-pipelined AES en-
cryption rate published in silicon. At 50 MHz, power consump-
tion results for the AES and full system architecture are 0.054 
W and 0.036 W, respectively.  
The WDDL coprocessor has 596 Kgates with an area of 
5.95-mm2 (2.45-mm2 for AES). The AES can operate at 85.5 
MHz for a 0.99 Gb/s encryption rate. For WDDL at 50 MHz, 
power consumption results are 0.200 W and 0.486 W for the 
AES and full system architecture, respectively. 
TABLE I . IC RESULTS SUMMARY 
Parameter Standard Cell WDDL 
Gate Count (eq. gates) [K] 199 596 
Area [mm2]   
 AES 0.79 2.45 
 Oracle 0.11 0.26 
 Memory 1.05 3.21 
 Entire System 1.98 5.95 
Maximum Frequency (@1.8V) [MHz]   
 AES 330.0 85.5* 
 Entire System 288.2 69.0* 
Maximum Throughput (@1.8V) [Gb/s]   
 AES 3.84 0.99 
Power Consumption (@1.8V, 50 MHz) [W]   
 AES 0.054 0.200† 
 Entire System 0.036 0.486† 
Measurements to Disclosure   
 min – mean – max‡ 320 – 2,133 – 8,168  
21,185 – 255,391 – 
1,276,186  
 Key bytes not found (@1.5M Meas.) n/a 5 
*Duty factor of clock > 50% to guarantee precharge of all gates
†Estimation based on area ratio AES vs. Entire System
‡Based on correctly guessed key bytes
 
Related Work 
As far as we know, this paper reports the first DPA-resistant 
circuit-plus-routing technique implemented and tested in actual 
silicon. [8] presents a dual-rail asynchronous technique in sili-
con, but does not use differential routing for matched capaci-
tances. We are aware of one silicon implementation of an algo-
rithmic countermeasure [9]. Measurements and assessment of 
the DPA resistance, however, have not yet been performed. 
Conclusions 
WDDL and differential routing is a functioning technique to 
thwart power attacks. Experimental results showed that 
1,500,000 acquisitions are not sufficient to fully disclose the 
128-b secret key. The trade-off is a three times increase in area, 
and a four times increase in power consumption and minimum 
clock period. Security partitioning [7] minimizes the cost for 
complex systems. Even with the penalties, the secure coproces-
sor still runs orders of magnitude faster and expends less en-
ergy than a software implementation on the main processor.  
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References 
[1] M. Renaudin, F. Bouesse, P. Proust, J. Tual, L. Sourgen and F. 
Germain, “High Security Smart-cards,” DATE, pp. 228-233, 2004. 
[2] P. Kocher, R. Lee, G. McGraw, A. Raghunathan and S. Ravi, 
“Security as a New Dimension in Embedded System Design,” DAC, 
pp. 753-760, 2004. 
[3] B. Schneier, “A Hardware DES Cracker,” Crypto-Gram News-
letter, http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9808.html#descracker, 
August 1998. 
[4] K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “A Logic Level Design Methodol-
ogy for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation,” 
DATE, pp. 246-251, 2004. 
[5] ITRS, “Interconnect,” International Technology Roadmap for 
Semiconductors, 
http://public.itrs.net/Files/2003ITRS/Interconnect2003.pdf, 2003. 
[6] K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “Place and Route for Secure Stan-
dard Cell Design,” CARDIS, pp. 143-158, 2004.  
[7] D. Hwang, P. Schaumont, K. Tiri and I. Verbauwhede, “Making 
Embedded Systems Secure,” submitted IEEE Security & Privacy 
Magazine. 
[8] J. Fournier, S. Moore, H. Li, R. Mullins and G. Taylor, "Security 
Evaluation of Asynchronous Circuits," CHES, pp. 137-151, 2003. 
[9] N. Pramstaller, F. Gürkaynak, S. Häne, H. Kaeslin, N. Felber, 
and W. Fichtner, “Towards an AES Crypto-chip Resistant to Differ-
ential Power Analysis,” ESSCIRC, pp. 307-310, 2004. 
